The Stimulus and The Somme

Depressing read of the day:
Mark Thoma gives us Joseph Stiglitz and Martin Feldstein being interviewed by Charlie Rose. I listened to it last night, and I found it so chilling that it adversely affected my sleep. . . . Both of them are keen on trying a big stimulus. Stiglitz says that everything done so far has been a failure, but again he doesn't draw the obvious conclusion. Instead, he says we have to try something bigger and different. I was reminded of the Battle of the Somme, one of the worst policy blunders of all time. Having experienced nothing but failure using offensive tactics up to that point, the Allies decided that what they needed to try was....a really big offensive. Just as Feldstein and Stiglitz pay no attention to the on-the-ground the housing market, the British generals ignored the impact of machine guns on men advancing over open fields. My guess is that in 1916, anyone who doubted his own ability to direct an enormous offensive involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers would never have made it to general. Similarly, today, anyone who doubts the ability of a handful of technocrats to sensibly allocate $800 billion would never make it into government or the mainstream media. . . . The arithmetic is mind-boggling. If 500 people have meaningful input, and the stimulus is almost $800 billion, then on average each person is responsible for taking more than $1.5 billion of our money and trying to spend it more wisely than we would spend it ourselves. I can imagine a wise technocrat taking $100,000 or perhaps even $1 million from American households and spending it more wisely than they would. But $1.5 billion? I do not believe that any human being knows so much that he or she can quickly and wisely allocate $1.5 billion. Once again, I am very happy that we are not fighting World War I. The Paulson/Obama offensives may be squandering resources, sowing confusion in households and businesses, and creating large financial imbalances. But they are not sending young men charging into machine guns.
We are about to become a nation of guinea pigs. UPDATE: More history from Philip Zelikow:
Unconsciously, we seem to be sliding into a totally domestic-focused approach on this problem, just as the U.S. did in 1933-34. Thus, even though we were doing some good (and bad) things domestically, the U.S. helped seal an unmistakable global assessment: Global coordination to save capitalism was dead. It was every state for itself. And to offer just one example of unforeseen consequences on little boats swamped in our wake: the United States de facto devaluation of silver in 1934 wrecked the struggling economy of the new Chinese republic, a blow from which it never really recovered.
UPDATE II: Martin Wolf -- Choices Made in 2009 Will Shape the Globe’s Destiny:
Banking crises are protracted, they note, with output declining, on average, for two years. Asset market collapses are deep, with real house prices falling, again on average, by 35 per cent over six years and equity prices declining by 55 per cent over 3½ years. The rate of unemployment rises, on average, by 7 percentage points over four years, while output falls by 9 per cent. . . . Now think what will happen if, after two or more years of monstrous fiscal deficits, the US is still mired in unemployment and slow growth. People will ask why the country is exporting so much of its demand to sustain jobs abroad. They will want their demand back. The last time this sort of thing happened – in the 1930s – the outcome was a devastating round of beggar-my-neighbour devaluations, plus protectionism. Can we be confident we can avoid such dangers? On the contrary, the danger is extreme. Once the integration of the world economy starts to reverse and unemployment soars, the demons of our past – above all, nationalism – will return. Achievements of decades may collapse almost overnight.
UPDATE III: Where's the Bottom? UPDATE IV: The libertarian perspective.

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